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THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT EXTENDS FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
FOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS WORKING ON SCHOOL-
SPONSORED NEWSPAPERS
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986)
In Kuhimeier v. Hazelwood School District,1 the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals imposed a heavy burden on school authorities by holding that
the first amendment prohibits them from preventing publication of arti-
cles in a school-sponsored newspaper unless publication would create
tort liability for the school.
Three student staff members of a high school journalism class newspa-
per' sued3 school authorities.4 The students claimed that the authorities
violated their first amendment rights5 by editing articles from the news-
1. 795 F.2d 1368, cert. granted (8th Cir. 1986).
2. The three plaintiffs attended Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis, Missouri. They
were members of the school's journalism class. In conjunction with this class, they served as staff
members for the Hazelwood East student newspaper, Spectrum. Kuhlmier v. Hazelwood Dist., 578
F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
3. The students brought the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. This statute provides in rele-
vant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The students sought injunctive relief, monetary damages, and a declaration that the school violated
their first amendment rights. 795 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir. 1986).
4. The defendants included the Hazelwood School District and the following, individually and
in their official capacities: the members of the Board of Education of the Hazelwood School District,
the superintendent, the assistant superintendent, and the principal. Id. at 1370.
5. More specifically, they alleged:
a) Spectrum was a free speech forum fully protected by the first amendment;
b) defendants' prior restraint of the May 13, 1983 issue of Spectrum denied plaintiffs' rights
secured by the first and fourteenth amendments; and c) defendants' policies, practices, cus-
toms, rules and regulations governing publication of Spectrum failed to compart with con-
stitutionally-mandated standards.
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
In relevant part, the first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the
Supreme Court made the first amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. The fourteenth amendment provides that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law....
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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paper.6 The district court held that the school could edit the newspaper
because the paper formed part of the school's curriculum.7 The Eighth
Circuit reversed and held: the first amendment protects school newspa-
pers that serve as public forums for student expression unless a school
can reasonably forecast that publication would substantially disrupt
school activities or interfere with the rights of others.8
Traditionally, state and local authorities control public education poli-
cies.9 Unless a school policy violates constitutional rights, 10 the courts
6. The Journalism II class published Spectrum eight to ten times a year. The class staff mem-
bers received credit for determining the content and layout of the paper, and for writing and editing
the articles. Before the class could publish any edition, the class had to submit the paper for ap-
proval to the teacher who taught the class and to the principal.
When the teacher took the May 13 edition to the principal for approval, the principal directed the
teacher to delete two articles that he found objectionable. Deletion of the two objectionable articles
required deletion of three other articles that were unobjectionable because they were located on the
same two pages. One article detailed three Hazelwood East students' experiences with pregnancy.
Although the article did not disclose the girls' names, the principal feared that the article revealed
their identity.
The other article discussed how divorce affected children. The article included an interview with
an unnamed student who gave reasons for her parents' divorce. The principal objected to this article
because the parents had not consented to the article and did not have an opportunity to respond.
795 F.2d at 1370-71. (8th Cir. 1986).
7. The district court held that the school did not violate the students' first amendment rights.
The court found that the newspaper was an integral part of the school's curriculum, rather than a
public forum for students' free expression. The court held that the school officials reasonably be-
lieved that the two articles would invade the privacy of others. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School
Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
8. 795 F.2d at 1370. (8th Cir. 1986).
9. By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and
local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which
arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply impli-
cate basic constitutional values.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
School boards generally rely upon their state's broad school board enabling act rather than specific
statutory provisions to sustain these policies. These policies include regulation of curriculum. See
Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982) (school could prevent publication of
newspaper that journalism class produced); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1981) (school
could prevent performance of school-sponsored theatrical production); Trachtman v. Anker, 563
F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978) (school could prevent distribution of sex
questionnaire in school newspaper because of fear that it would cause harm); Bell v. U-32 Bd. of
Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939 (D. Vt. 1986) (school could prevent production of play because it believed
that the play was inappropriate for high school students); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (school could prevent publication of letter in official school newspaper that would
substantially disrupt school); Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), aff'd, 348 F.2d
464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966) (school did not violate teacher's constitutional
rights when school fired teacher for assigning an obscene book, Brave New World).
But see Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Stanton v. Bruns-
wick School Dep't, 577 F. Supp. 1560 (D.Ma. 1984); Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F.
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rarely intervene. Courts reason that professional educators, not judges,
best effectuate the educational function of schools.1" Courts also have
acknowledged that public education should promote the values of the
local community. 2 Public educators will promote local values if com-
munities can politically influence those who make educational
decisions3
When school policies are challenged as violating the first amendment,
Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. N.Y. 1974) aff'd without
op., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); and Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Public educators historically have been responsible for regulating much more than curriculum.
For example, one of the primary purposes of education includes inculcating societal values. Noah
Webster wrote the following:
[S]ociety requires that the education of youth should be watched with the most scrupulous
attention. Education, in a great measure, forms the moral characters of men, and morals
are the basis of government. Education should therefore be the first care of a legislature,
not merely the institution of schools but the furnishing of them with the best men for
teachers.
WEBSTER, On the Education of Youth in America in ESSAYS ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUB-
LIC 41, 64 (F. Rudolph ed. 1965) (footnote omitted).
In more recent times, schools have imposed numerous restrictions based on societal values. These
restrictions arguably interfere with student rights, including their rights of speech, privacy, freedom
of association and due process. Yet the courts usually defer to the judgments of the school boards in
cases challenging these restrictions. See Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986); Board
of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68
(1979); Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S 589 (1915); King v. Suddleback Jr. College Dist., 445
F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972); Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir.
1972); Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Davis v. Firment, 269 F.
Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967); Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965);
Pugsley v. Se~lmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923). See generally Diamond, The First Amend-
ment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REV. 477, 501-505
(1981); Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Conduct and Status:
A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U, PA. L. REV. 373 (1969). But see Comment, Personal Appear-
ances of Students-The Abuse of a Protected Freedom, 20 ALA. L. REV. 104 (1967).
10. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
US. 624 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404
(1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See generally Developments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1051-1055 (1968).
11. Educators are better equipped to discern which policies will maximize an educational expe-
rience. See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 858, 891 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also
Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968); Diamond, The First
Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477, 506-
507, n. 130 (1981).
12. See supra note 9.
13. "[L]ocal control of education involves democracy in a microcosm." Board of Education v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 891 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Local educators, unlike judges, are more
likely to respond to a community's educational goals. Communities can, therefore, politically influ-
ence school boards and teachers. Id.
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the courts have not automatically deferred to school authorities. 14  In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,"5 the Supreme Court
enunciated a test that the courts have applied to determine the bounda-
ries of students' first amendment rights.16 The Tinker Court held that a
school could not prohibit student symbolic conduct unless the school
could reasonably forecast that the students' expression either substan-
tially interfered with the work of the school or interfered with the rights
of others.17 The Court concluded that students retain first amendment
rights in school.18 The Court, however, limited these rights by noting
"the special characteristics of the school environment." 9
14. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
15. 393 U.S. 503 (1968). In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that school officials violated the
first amendment rights of students. The school had briefly suspended students who violated a school
rule by wearing an armband to protest the Vietnam War.
16. In the past eighteen years, any discussion of student's first amendment rights has begun
with Tinker. The courts usually begin by talismanically quoting the following passage:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school envi-
ronment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech of expression at the
schoolhouse gate.
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1968).
17. Id. at 514. See generally Nahmod, Beyond Tinker. The High School as an Educational
Public Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 278 (1970); Note, Constitutional Law-Symbolic
Speech-Wearing ofArm Bands to School to Protest Viet Nam War, 20 MERCER L. REV. 505 (1969);
and Note, Symbolic Speech, High School Protest and the First Amendment, 9 J. FAMILY L. 119
(1969).
18. See supra note 16. The Supreme Court, however, has held consistently that children's con-
stitutional rights are not coextensive with those of adults. See Bethel School District v. Fraser, 106
S.Ct. 3159 (1986) (school could punish student for making sexually suggestive speech even though it
was not obscene); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (school may conduct search and seizure
of student property based only on reasonable grounds, as opposed to probable cause, that students
violated law); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, concur-
ring) (students first amendment rights not "co-extensive with those of adults"); Ginsberg v, New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1967) (state law permitting adults, but not minors, to buy nonobscene "girlie"
magazines sustained); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state law prohibiting minors
from selling literature in public sustained).
These cases illustrate the strong governmental interest in protecting youth, not in depriving them
of rights. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecent radio program banned to protect
children). See generally Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 321 (1979);
and Gyory, The Constitutional Rights of Public School Pupils, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 223-24
(1971).
19. Tinker at 507. The special characteristics that justify limiting students' rights include the
interest of states and school authorities in maintaining comprehensive authority "to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools." Id. See also, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
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Additionally, the Court asserted that protecting students' first amend-
ment rights furthers the pedagogical function of schools. The Court
equated public schools with public forums2" that provide a place for indi-
viduals to exchange ideas.21 The Court believed that schools must simi-
larly provide a place for students to communicate. According to the
Court, schools exemplify the ideal place for "[t]he vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms"22 because "wide exposure to ... robust ex-
change of ideas ... discovers truth."23  This discovery process furthers
"an important part of ... [education]." 24
Although Tinker only addressed symbolic expression by students, the
courts have applied the "Tinker test" to cases concerning school supervi-
sion of student publications." The Supreme Court has not verified the
suitability of applying the test to these cases. Consequently, the federal
20. The Supreme Court has identified a first amendment right for individuals to use public
property such as parks and streets for communicative purposes. The Court has not clarified the
extent of this privilege. Some argue that this privilege is absolute, and that government must make
some public places available for the expression of ideas. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Others argue that this privilege only obligates government to provide equal access to public property.
See Massachusetts v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), affirmed, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
The Court has adjudicated whether this privilege extends to non-traditional fora such as libraries,
jails, buses, and schools. The first amendment does not obligate government to provide a public
forum in these places. When government does create an open forum for free expression, the first
amendment protects the expression.
21. The Supreme Court has held that Government does not create a public forum merely be-
cause individuals use the public property in question to communicate. See eg. United States Postal
Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns., 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (letterboxes not a public fo-
rum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (bulletin board in cafeteria of military base not a public
forum); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (advertising space on city's buses not
a public forum). See generally Harning, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE
L. J. 931; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Note,
The Public School as Public Forum, 54 TEx. L. REv. 90 (1975).
22. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512, quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
23. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512, quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
24. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512. The Court argued that schools must prepare students to live in a
democratic society. Confining student speech to officially approved beliefs does not teach democracy
because it "foster[s] ... homogeneous people." Id. at 511. Therefore, schools must promote diver-
gent views by permitting students to freely communicate "[w]hen [they] are in the cafeteria, or on
the playing field, or on the campus during authorized hours .. " Id. at 512-13.
25. Cases involving school regulation of student publications fall into two distinct categories.
One category involves schools regulating non-school student publications. The other category in-
volves school-sponsored student publications. Students' first amendment rights generally prevail
when the publication is non-school sponsored. See e.g. Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.
1975); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., 460 F.2d
1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Quar-
terman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir.
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courts have used the test frequently and inconsistently.2 6 The Seventh,
Fourth, and Second Courts of Appeals have developed three distinct
approaches.
The Seventh Circuit completely prohibits schools from requiring
teachers or administrators to give prior approval27 to student publica-
tions. 28  In Fujishima v. Board of Education29 the court30 argued31 that
1971); Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1977); and Poxon v. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.
Supp. 256 (E.D. Ca. 1971).
When determining the scope of students' first amendment rights within the context of a school-
sponsored publication, courts usually analyze whether the publication is an open public forum for
free expression or an integral part of the school curriculum. If the publication is curriculum, the
courts apply a very deferential review and usually sustain the school's regulation. The court in
Fraska v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. N.Y. 1979) provided a helpful test:
[T]he rule has been wisely established that decisions of school officials will be sustained,
even in a First Amendment context, when, on the facts before them at the time of the
conduct which is challenged, there was a substantial and reasonable basis for the action
taken.
Id. at 1052 (emphasis added). See also Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982);
Trachtmann v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). But see
Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Reineke v. Cobb County
School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. N.Y.
1974), aff'd without op., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. N.Y.
1969).
The first amendment does not obligate schools to provide students a public forum for free expres-
sion. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3rd Cir. 1984). When school officials
do create an open forum for student expression, the first amendment does provide limited protection.
Id. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
26. Compare the Seventh Circuit's prohibition against all prior restraints with the Second Cir-
cuit's highly deferential rational basis approach.
27. The Supreme Court has held that government may rarely restrict any type of speech prior
to expression because of the risk that government will suppress protected speech. See New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697
(1931); See also Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). See generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955); and Note, Prior Restraints in Public High Schools, 82 YALE L. J.
1325 (1973).
28. These cases all involve schools imposing restraints on non-school student newspapers. The
court has not addressed whether it would allow schools to impose prior restraints on school-spon-
sored publications. See Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973); Fujishima
v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th
Cir. 1970); Spartacus v. Board of Trustees, 502 F. Supp. 789 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
29. 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
30. The Seventh Circuit also limits the ability of schools to subsequently punish students. In
Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), school authorities expelled students for
distributing in school a student written publication.
The paper ridiculed school policies and authorities. In light of the publication's immature audi-
ence, the district court found that the criticism "amounted to an immediate advocacy of, and incite-
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literally applying the Tinker test means that "schools may not restrain
the full First-Amendment rights of their students."32 These rights, ac-
cording to the court, include the freedom to distribute written material
without prior approval.33
Other circuits,34 including the Fourth Circuit,35 permit prior approval
of student publications. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit contends that
rules providing for approval36 "come to the court with a presumption
against their constitutionality."37 To draft permissible rules, school au-
thorities must establish criteria and review procedures conforming to the
Tinker test.38
ment to, disregard of school administrative procedures." Id. at 12. Therefore, the school did not
violate the students' rights in expelling them.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court. The court prefaced its argument by noting that
"[h]igh school students are persons entitled to [constitutional protection]." The court then criticized
the lower court for implicitly using the clear and present danger test instead of the Tinker test. Id. at
12. The court held that the school did not reasonably forecast substantial disruption of school activ-
ity. Id. at 13.
31. Fujishima restricted school authorities even more than Scoville. See supra note 30. In Fuj-
ishima, authorities disciplined students for violating a school rule that prohibited distributing on
school premises any publications without prior approval. The court held that any prior restraint of
student publications is unconstitutional.
32. 460 F.2d 1355, 1357 (1972) (emphasis provided).
33. The court combined the holdings of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1932), and Tinker to
reach its conclusion. See supra footnotes 27 & 28 for discussion of Near and prior restraints.
The court argued that the "reasonable forecast" part of the Tinker test did not authorize schools
to prevent distribution of material. The test meant that a school may only subsequently punish
students if the school reasonably forecasts that continued distribution would interfere with school
discipline. 460 F.2d at 1358.
The court cited other courts that had invalidated prior restraints imposed on college students.
The court did not address the differences between high school and college students and the possible
reasons for treating their publications differently. Some courts and commentators sensibly argue
that students of different ages should be treated differently. See Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 58
(4th Cir. 1971) ("difference... between the rights of free speech attaching to publications distributed
in a secondary school and those in a college"); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 1027, 1052-53 (1969) ("tolerable limit for student expression in high school should be nar-
rower than at college or university level"); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1045, 1130 (1968) ("responsible student criticism of university officials is socially valuable").
34. Another circuit following the Fourth Circuit's approach includes the Fifth, see Shanley v.
Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) and Reineke v. Cobb County School
Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
35. See Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980); Gambino v. Fairfax County School
Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v.
Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); and Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
36. See supra note 27.
37. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973).
38. To satisfy the criteria requirement, the rule must state that officials can impose prior re-
straints only in those special circumstances when they can "reasonably forecast substantial disrup-
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In Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board,39 the school urged that
these requirements did not apply because the school-sponsored newspa-
per formed part of the school's journalism curriculum.' As curriculum,
the school argued, the paper was subject to the "same administrative
controls as other educational programs."41 The Gambino court rejected
this argument and found that the newspaper was a public forum42 for
student expression.43 The first amendment, according to the court, pro-
tects a school-funded, teacher-supervised newspaper that communicates
opinions.' The court then held that the prior approval requirement vio-
tion of or material interference with school activities." Id. at 1348, quoting Quarterman v. Byrd, 453
F.2d 54, 58-59 (4th Cir. 1971).
Schools must also satisfy procedural requirements. They must set up an "expeditious review pro-
cedure" for the appeal of any prior restraint decision. Further, they must provide for a "specified
and reasonably short period of time in which the principal must act." Baughman v. Freienmuth,
478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973). See Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1971)
(schools failed to satisfy both criteria and procedural requirements).
In Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975), a case following Baughman and Quarterman,
the court placed a heavier burden on schools, requiring them to use much ingenuity in drafting a
permissible rule. In Nitzberg, the school used a prior restraint rule to order two private student
newspapers to cease distribution at school. The school had obviously attempted to write the rule in
conformity with the court's criteria and procedural requirements. Id. at 381.
Nevertheless, the court invalidated the rule because it did not clearly define what constituted a
"substantial disruption" of school activities. Moreover, it did not detail what factors an administra-
tor would consider in predicting a substantial disruption. Id. at 383.
39. 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977). In Gambino, the principal
prohibited the publication of articles containing information and student attitudes about contracep-
tives. The school board affirmed the principal's decision, arguing that the articles violated a school
board rule. The rule prohibited the schools from offering information about contraceptives. Id. at
733.
When the students challenged the constitutionality of the school's action, the board argued that
the school could control the school paper because the paper functioned as a student activity. As a
student activity, the paper must "relate ... to the school program and not interfere with school
operation." Id. at 733. The school board reasoned that publication of the articles would interfere
with the school's operations because the articles contravened the school board's resolution not to
offer information about contraceptives. Id. at 734.
40. The school offered the following as evidence that the paper was curriculum: 1) staff mem-
bers were enrolled in a journalism class and received academic credit; 2) the school paid a teacher a
supplemental salary to supervise the students' work; 3) the students worked on the paper at school
during school hours; and 4) the school partially funded the paper. Id. at 734.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 20 for discussion of public forum.
43. 429 F. Supp. at 734. The court rejected the school's curriculum argument by noting that
the extent of state involvement in providing funds and facilities does not determine the applicability
of first amendment protection. Moreover, the court found first amendment protection for this publi-
cation because the school "conceived, established, and operated [the paper] as a conduit for student
expression on a wide variety of topics." Id. at 735.
44. Id.
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lated the students' first amendment rights because it failed to comply
with "the detailed criteria required by the... Fourth Circuit...."IS
The Second Circuit affords schools the most latitude to supervise stu-
dent publications.46 As in the Fourth Circuit, the court permits schools
to impose administrative prior approval.4 7 The Second Circuit's analysis
of Tinker, however, differs in two ways. First, the Second Circuit im-
poses no criteria and procedural requirements.48 Second, the Second Cir-
cuit only requires school officials to demonstrate a rational basis for
interfering with student speech.4 9 This rational basis requirement means
that schools may restrict expression if facts exist from which a court
could possibly conclude that distribution of the material would substan-
tially disrupt school activities or interfere with the rights of others."
Trachtman v. Anker,5" the court's most recent school publication case,
illustrates this deferential rational basis interpretation of Tinker. In
Trachtman, school administrators denied approval of a student proposal
45. 429 F. Supp. at 736. See supra note 38 for discussion of the Fourth Circuit's criteria and
procedural requirements.
46. The following quote illustrates the court's deferential attitude: "It is to everyone's advan-
tage that decisions with respect to the operation of local schools be made by local officials." Eisner
v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971).
See also Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 98 U.S. 925 (1978); Frasca
v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y.
1972). But see Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.
1975).
47. In Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971), the court noted that Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and the cases that followed Near mentioned several exceptions to
the usual rule against prior restraints. According to the court, Tinker establishes that the schools are
one of the "exceptional cases" where prior restraints are permissible. Id. at 807.
48. The court has expressly relied upon the good faith of school administrators to protect ex-
pression that would not create material disturbances.
Although the policy does not specify that the foreseeable disruption be either "material" or
"substantial" as Tinker requires, we assume that the board would never contemplate the
futile as well as unconstitutional suppression of matter that would create only an immate-
rial disturbance.
440 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1971).
49. The court has said that "school authorities need only demonstrate that the basis of their
belief in a potential disruption is reasonable and not based on speculation." 563 F.2d 512, 517 n. 5
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 98 U.S. 503 (1978).
50. The court reasons that this deferential standard of review is appropriate because
school authorities are sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable concerning these matters,
which have been entrusted to them by the community; a federal court ought not impose its
own views in such matters where there is a rational basis for the decisions and actions of
the school authorities.
Id. at 519.
51. 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 98 U.S. 503 (1978).
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to survey and publish 2 students' sexual attitudes and experiences.53 The
students contested the constitutionality of the school's denial. The
school argued that denying the survey was constitutional because it satis-
fied the second prong of the Tinker test. Permitting the survey would
cause interference with the rights of others. 4
To buttress this argument, the school presented evidence' s that the
survey "would result in significant psychological harm to members of
[the high school]." 5 6 The district court found that the survey would psy-
chologically harm freshmen and sophomores but not older students.5
The Second Circuit reversed that part of the district court's judgment
which permitted surveying the older students. 8 The court admonished
the lower court by emphasizing that courts should not reevaluate the
wisdom of school officials' actions when such actions have a rational
basis.59
In Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District,6" the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals followed the Fourth Circuit's holding in Gambino.6" The
court held that school officials desiring to regulate a school publication
that conveys student opinion must reasonably forecast that an article
would substantially interfere with school activities or the rights of
others.62 According to the court, "interference with the rights of others"
refers only to a tortious act.6 3
52. The students wished to publish the results in the high school newspaper in an article enti-
tled "Sexuality in Stuyvesant". Id. at 515.
53. The students had prepared a questionnaire that contained questions requiring "frank infor-
mation about the student's sexual experience," and covered such topics as premarital sex, contracep-
tion, homosexuality, masturbation and the extent of students' "sexual experience." Id. at 515.
54. 563 F.2d at 519. See generally Diamond, Interference with the Rights of Others: Authority
to Restrict Students' First Amendment Rights, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 347 (1979).
55. The school presented four expert witnesses who testified that distributing the questionnaires
was a "potentially dangerous" act that was "likely to result in serious injury to at least some of the
students." Id. at 517.
56. Id. at 520.
57. Id. at 515.
58. Id. at 519.
59. Id. The court emphasized that the
[school's] action ... is not so much a curtailment of any First Amendment rights; it is
principally a measure to protect the students committed to their care ... from peer con-
tacts and pressures which may result in emotional disturbance to some of those students
whose responses are sought.
Id. at 519.
60. 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986).
61. See supra note 43 for discussion of the Gambino holding.
62. 795 F.2d at 1374.
63. Id. at 1376.
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The district court did not apply the Tinker test because it found that
the paper was an integral part of the school curriculum.' The Eighth
Circuit rejected this factual finding and held that the paper "was in-
tended to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint."65
The school failed, according to the court, to satisfy the first part of the
Tinker test because the school did not reasonably forecast that the de-
leted articles would have substantially disrupted school activities.66 In
applying the second part of the test, the court interpreted "invasion of
the rights of others" to mean a tortious act.6 7 The court, however, did
not rely on precedent for its interpretation.6" Instead, the court relied
upon a law review article.6 9
[S]chool officials are justified in limiting student speech... only when publication of that
speech could result in tort liability for the school. Any yardstick less exacting... could
result in school officials curtailing speech at the slightest fear of disturbance.
Id.
64. The district court cited the following as evidence that the newspaper was curriculum:
[1] Journalism 11 class produced Spectrum and a teacher taught the class. [2] Students used a text-
book and received academic credit. [3] The curriculum guide of Hazelwood East described the
Journalism II class as a "laboratory situation", and Spectrum as the laboratory exercise. [5] Spec-
trum was "developed within the adopted curriculum". [6] The teacher's salary did not indicate that
his supervision was extracurricular. [7] The teacher exercised control over the publication process.
795 F.2d at 1371-72.
65. Id. at 1372. The court noted factors that made the paper, in the court's judgment, "a
'student publication' in every sense." Id. The students chose the staff members, determined the
content of the paper, and wrote the articles. Moreover, the paper presented topics of interest to
students from a student viewpoint.
The paper published a statement of policy stating that the first amendment protected the paper.
The statement also provided that the paper would follow the journalism guidelines in the journalism
class textbook. This textbook said that schools could not impose prior restraints based on the Tinker
test. Further, the textbook said that the student press has "essentially the same rights and responsi-
bilities as the mass media." Id. at 1372-73.
The court cited several cases to support its conclusion. See Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403,
755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Suppp. 731 (E.D.
Va.), aff'd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. N.Y.), aff'd
without opinion, 515 F.2d 503 (2nd Cir. 1975); Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp.
1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980). The Supreme Court reversed Fraser after the court decided Kuhlmeier.
66. The school did not claim that the articles would have substantially disrupted school activi-
ties. 795 F.2d at 1375.
67. Id. at 1376. The court reasoned that the tortious act interpretation made schools use pre-
established legal standards in deciding whether an article invaded another's rights.
68. The only other court that has interpreted the second part of the Tinker test is Trachtman v.
Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1977). That court found that psychological harm would satisfy the
test. See supra note 54. The Kuhlmeier court did not address the Trachtman court's reasoning.
69. The court said, "We are persuaded by [the article's] analysis.... Any yardstick less exact-
ing than potential tort liability could result in school officials curtailing speech at the slightest fear of
disturbance." 795 F.2d 1368, 1376 (8th Cir. 1986). See Note, Administrative Regulation of the High
School Press, 83 MICH. L. REv. 625, 640 (1984).
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The school also failed, according to the court, to satisfy the second
part of the test.7° The court considered that invasion of privacy was the
only tort that the student article could have caused.7' After quoting sev-
eral established definitions of the tort,72 the court concluded that the arti-
cle would not create liability.73
A dissenting opinion vigorously argued that the newspaper formed an
integral part of the school curriculum.74 The dissent observed that
courts traditionally give schools broad authority to make curriculum de-
cisions.75 Tinker did not, according to the dissent, change this tradi-
tion.76 Treating the school newspaper as a public forum undermines the
ability of schools to educate by forcing schools to allocate resources in
litigation.77
The Kuhimeier court erred by characterizing the school-sponsored
newspaper as a public forum.7 8 The court should have affirmed the dis-
trict court's finding that the school created the paper primarily as a class
exercise.79 The school's policies and operation of the newspaper provide
ample evidence of the paper's curricular purpose.
70. The court summarily dismissed the possibility of the divorce action creating tort liability.
The court found that the article was "nothing more than an anecedotal treatment of the subject of
divorce" because the article did not reveal the names of the interviewed students. 795 F.2d at 1376.
71. Id.
72. See W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS 809 (4th Ed. 1971); and American
Bar Assn., Standards Relating to Schools and Education 84 (1982).
73. According to the court, the article on pregnancy did not invade the privacy of anyone. The
article did not name the pregnant girls. Even if the article identified them, the girls could not main-
tain an action because they consented to the interview. Moreover, the article did not disclose the
identity of the boyfriends, and the article did not reveal any details of the parents' lives. 795 F.2d at
1376.
74. The dissenting judge based his argument on the district court's findings. See supra note 64.
75. See Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 869 (1982); and Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1981).
76. The dissent argued,
Tinker ... should not be held to give rise to a collective first amendment right to publish a
school-sponsored, faculty-supervised newspaper with the same lack of constraints enjoyed
by the commercial press or, for that matter, a solely student-sponsored extracurricular
paper totally removed from the aegis of the school.
795 F.2d at 1378.
77. The dissent observed that the majority's decision placed the school in a precarious position
that forced the school to "chart a course between the Scylla of a student-led first amendment suit
and the Charybdis of a tort action by those claiming to have been injured by the publication of
student-written material." Id. at 1378-79. Schools, unlike the commercial press, cannot pay an
attorney to give daily advice concerning potential tort liability. Id. at 1379.
78. 795 F.2d at 1372.
79. See supra note 65.
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The school board's enunciated policies concerning the student newspa-
per clearly illustrated the curricular purpose of the newspaper. The
statement provided publication guidelines for the journalism students by
stating that students could express opinions "within the rule of responsi-
ble journalism."80 School authorities established these rules because the
"publications [were] developed within the adopted curriculum and its ed-
ucational implications in regular classroom activities."81 Moreover, the
statement explicitly stated that students could not publish material that
the board considered inappropriate, including material that would inter-
rupt the educational process.82
The school's operation of the paper also illustrates the curricular pur-
pose of the paper. Students did not operate the paper as an extracurricu-
lar activity.83 Instead, the school operated the paper as an integral part
of the school system.84 The newspaper's informational function did not
negate the paper's primary educational purpose. The Supreme Court has
held consistently that public property, e.g. a public school's newspaper,
does not become a public forum merely because individuals use it to
communicate information and ideas.85
In addition, ignoring the school's curricular purpose defeats policies
favoring local school control.8 6 Courts usually respect the professional
decisions of educators, recognizing that educators better understand the
variables that maximize an educational experience.87 The school author-
ities intended to provide a "real life" journalistic experience for the stu-
dents with all the "rights and responsibilities of the mass media."88
The Kuhlmeier court should have deferred to the school's decision to
make the journalism students' experience realistic. In the commercial
80. 795 F.2d at 1377 n. 7. The statement also provided publication guidelines for non-journal-
ism students. These students, like the journalism students, did not have an absolute right to express
opinions. A committee composed of the principal, three faculty members, and two journalism stu-
dents decided what material to publish. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id. The school provided a teacher to instruct the journalism students and to oversee every
aspect of the publication process. The teacher's salary for overseeing publication was not commen-
surate with the nature of an extracurricular activity. 795 F.2d at 1372.
84. The students produced the paper to fulfill journalism class requirements and to receive
academic credit. The school's curriculum guide described the journalism class as a "laboratory situ-
ation" and the newspaper as the laboratory exercise. Id.
85. See supra note 21.
86. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 50.
88. 795 F.2d at 1373 n. 4.
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world, editors can choose freely which articles not to print.8 9 Similarly,
school authorities, acting as proprietors of the public schools, can discern
which articles will detract from the newspaper's educational purpose.
Courts also defer to the decisions of school authorities because courts
wish to promote local educational goals. The courts reason that local
communities will use the political process to affect changes if the school's
decisions contravene local goals.90 The Kuhlmeier court has circum-
scribed the Hazelwood community's ability to influence the school cur-
riculum by replacing the school's judgment with the court's.
Moreover, the court unjustifiably limited the second part of the Tinker
test.91 The court's unprecedented interpretation92 undermines the ability
of schools to educate in several ways. First, the court's interpretation,
"pits students against school officials." 93 The court's rationale for requir-
ing tort liability was that it would make school officials follow "previ-
ously defined legal standards." 94 The court's reasoning implicitly
reinforces what many students believe, that school officials generally
abuse their authority and oppress students.95
Second, the court's interpretation drains the schools' resources.
Schools will spend more time and money in court because students will
be more likely to litigate. 96 Additionally, the court's interpretation forces
schools to spend money for legal advice to avoid litigation.97
The Eighth Circuit's characterization of the paper as a public forum is
unsound. The policy statement and operation of the Hazelwood school
newspaper clearly illustrate its curricular function. Ignoring the curricu-
lar purpose of the paper frustrates policies favoring local control of edu-
cation. The court's holding supersedes the professional judgments of
89. See Passaic Daily News v. NLRB, 10 Med. L. Rptr. 1905 (1984).
90. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text for discussion of the second part of the Tinker
test.
92. See supra note 68.
93. 795 F.2d at 1378.
94. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
95. The Hazelwood school, however, did not oversee the student newspaper to oppress stu-
dents. The school retained control to protect students from their own inexperience and immaturity.
Therefore, part of the students' education included learning what articles were inappropriate and
damaging in a given publication. See supra note 18 for governmental interest in protecting youth.
See also Developments in the Law--Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1053 (1968).
96. Students will be more likely to litigate to ensure that school authorities correctly anticipated
tort liability.
97. See supra note 77.
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educators and circumvents the ability of the Hazelwood community to
influence politically the educational goals of the school. Finally, the
court's potential tort requirement impairs the capacity of schools to edu-
cate. The holding encourages more students to challenge the decisions of
school officials. Increased litigation will detract from an atmosphere that
is conducive to education, and reallocates the resources of schools to
avoid and defend unnecessary lawsuits.
J.CR.
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